Security of Searchable Encrypted Cloud Storage

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Outsourced storage and searching

- "records" could be emails, text documents, Salesforce records, …
- searching is performed efficiently in the cloud via standard techniques
End-to-end encryption breaks searching

- Searching incompatible with privacy goals of traditional encryption
Companies actively trying to navigate this tension, providing **Searchable Encryption**

- **CipherCloud**
  - Trust in the Cloud™
- **bitglass**
- **skyhigh**
- **CRYPTERON**
  - Secure Your Cloud Data
Searchable Symmetric Encryption [SWP’00, CGKO’06, …]

- Also includes Update Protocol for adding new documents/records
Example SSE Construction

Client uploads an *encrypted inverted index*

```
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>keyword</th>
<th>records</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>45e8a</td>
<td>4, 9,37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>092ff</td>
<td>9,37,93,94,95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f61b5</td>
<td>9,37,89,90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cc562</td>
<td>4,37,62,75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
```

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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
```

Client

\[ H(K, \text{dog}) = 45e8a \]

Cloud provider

All SE leaks some information to the server
What does SSE leakage look like?

Keywords/data not in the clear, but some info can be derived by server

Highly unclear if/when this leakage is dangerous
How SE is analyzed in the literature

Crypto security definitions usually formalize e.g.:
“nothing is leaked about the input, except size”

SE uses a weakened type of definition:

• Identify a formal “leakage function” \( L \)
• Allows server to learn info corresponding to \( L \), but no more

Example \( L \) outputs:

• Result lengths (number of records matching a query term)
• Repeated Queries
• Repeated record IDs across search results (access pattern)
• Update information
Main question:
What can the cloud provider learn about your data from this leakage?

Currently almost no guidance in the literature.

A messy question that depends on many variables.

- Type of data, size of dataset, how data is processed, what queries look like, update frequency, adversary knowledge, attacker goal, etc., etc.
One prior work: Identifying queries

Under certain circumstances, a high percentage of queries (80%) can be deduced by a curious server who knows the contents of all of the documents that were encrypted.

[Islam-Kuzu-Kantarcıoğlu ‘12]

(sketched later)
This work: Practical Exploitability of SE Leakage

Broaden and systematize the approach of [IKK ‘12]:

1. **Different adversary goals**: Document (record) recovery in addition to query recovery
2. **Different levels of adversary knowledge**: (full, partial, and distributional)
3. **Active adversaries**: planted documents

Simple **leakage-abuse attacks** for query recovery and document recovery, with experiments

- Attacks apply to all constructions with the same or greater **leakage profile**
Datasets for Attack Experiments

Enron Emails

- 30109 documents from employee sent_mail folders (to focus on intra-company email)
- When considering 5000 indexed keywords, average of 93 keywords/document

Apache Emails

- 50582 documents from Lucene project’s java-user mailing list
- With 5000 keywords, average of 291 keywords/document

Processed with standard IR keyword extraction techniques (Porter stemming, stopword removal)
Outline of Results

1. Simpler query recovery

2. Document text recovery from partial server content knowledge

3. Document text recovery via active attack (planted documents)
Query recovery using document knowledge  [IKK ‘12]

Attack setting:

- **Minimal leakage**: Only record IDs matching each query, nothing revealed beforehand
- Server knows all document content
- $k$ random queries issued
- **Adversary Goal**: Learn the queries

Server Observes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>keyword</th>
<th>records</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q1</td>
<td>4,37,62,75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2</td>
<td>9,37,93,94,95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3</td>
<td>4, 9,37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q4</td>
<td>8,37,89,90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unknown term-doc matrix:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>rec1</th>
<th>rec2</th>
<th>rec3</th>
<th>rec4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Example Public Financial Data
The IKK attack (sketch)

Term Co-occurrence matrix:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Q1</th>
<th>Q2</th>
<th>Q3</th>
<th>Q4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

• Server constructs term-term co-occurrence matrix
• Attempts to solve optimization problem of matching to known term co-occurrence matrix
• Over 80% of queries correctly identified for small index sizes (1500 keywords)
The IKK attack works only if the server has highly accurate knowledge of the document set.

If that’s the case, then why not just look at the *number* of document IDs returned by a query?

**Observation:** When there’s only one query that returns a certain number of documents, then the server can immediately identify that query.
Query Recovery via Result Counts

- After finding unique-match queries, we then “disambiguate” remaining queries by checking intersections

### Leakage:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>rec1</th>
<th>rec2</th>
<th>rec3</th>
<th>rec4</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Q1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Q5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q2 overlapped w/ one record containing “Lewis” so it must be “Wheaton”

Q3 matched 3 records, so it must be “Lewis”
Query Recovery Experiment

Setup: • Enron email dataset
• 10% queried at random

Runs in seconds, not hours
Query Recovery with Partial Knowledge

- What if document set is only partially known to the server?

- We generalized the counting attack to account for partial information, and tested the count and IKK attacks when only $x\%$ of the documents are known.
Enron emails, 500 most frequent keywords indexed (stemmed, non-stopwords), 150 queried at random, 5% of queries initially given to server as hint.
1. Simpler query recovery

2. Document recovery from partial knowledge

3. Document recovery via active attack
This blob indexes some docs I happen to know and others I don’t… What does that tell me?
Passive Document Recovery Attack Setting

- No queries issued at all
- Content of some documents becomes known to the server
- **Attacker Goal**: Recover other document contents
A Widely-Used Construction

- Attack works on the leakage from "appended keyword hash" constructions:

  Record 1:
  - The quick brown fox […]
  - $H(K,\text{quick}), H(K,\text{brown}), H(K,\text{fox}), \ldots$

  Record 2:
  - The fast red fox […]
  - $H(K,\text{fast}), H(K,\text{red}), H(K,\text{fox}), \ldots$

Actual systems:
- Mimesis [Lau et al’14]
- Shadowcrypt [He et al’14]
Simple Observation

Known:

Doc 1:
zAFDr7ZS99TztuSBIf[...]
H(K, quick), H(K, brown),
H(K, fox), ...

Doc 2:
zAFDr7ZS99TztuSBIf[...]
H(K, fast), H(K, red),
H(K, fox), ...

Unknown:

• If server knows Doc 1, then learns when any word in Doc 1 appears in other docs

• More revealing case: Hash values stored in word order of first appearance.

• Harder but still possible if hash in random order. (see paper)
Document Recovery from Partial Knowledge

For each dataset, server knowing either 2 or 20 random emails

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dataset, # Known Docs</th>
<th>Average Keywords Recovered / Doc</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enron, 2</td>
<td>16.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enron, 20</td>
<td>56.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apache, 2</td>
<td>50.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apache, 20</td>
<td>68.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Anecdotal Example

Original email:

The attached contract is ready for signature. Please print 2 documents and have Atmos execute both and return same to my attention. I will return an original for their records after ENA has signed. Or if you prefer, please provide me with the name / phone # / address of your customer and I will Fed X the Agreement.

Reconstructed in-order stems:

attach contract ___ signatur pleas print 2 document have ___ execut both ___ same ___ will origin ___ ena sign prefer provid name ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ agreement

• From Enron with 20 random known documents
• Note effect of stemming, stopword removal, and revealing each word once
The effect of one public document

Case study: A single email from the Enron corpus, sent to 500 employees

- 832 Unique Keywords
- Topic: an upcoming survey of the division by an outside consulting group.

The vocabulary of this single document would let a server recover on average 35% of the words in every document, not counting stopwords.
Outline

1. Simpler query recovery

2. Document recovery from partial knowledge

3. Document recovery via active attack
Chosen-Document-Addition Attacks

Leakage from my crafted email!

Local Proxy

Emails

SE index

update protocol
Chosen-Document Attack ⇒ Learn chosen hashes

• Again we attack the appended-keyword-hash constructions

Doc 1:
The quick brown fox [...]

Doc 1:
zAFDr7ZS99TztuSBIf[...]
H(K, quick), H(K, brown),
H(K, fox), ...

Doc 1:
zAFDr7ZS99TztuSBIf[...]
H(K, fox), H(K, quick),
H(K, brown), ...

• Hashes stored in document order ⇒ very easy attack
• Hashes not in order ⇒ more difficult (we attack now)
Chosen Document Attack Experiment

**Goal:** Maximize number of keywords learned from a minimum number of chosen documents (emails)

**Attack Sketch:**

1. Malicious server constructs a series of emails, each with a small number of chosen keywords
2. Server observes insertion of planted emails into its index, seeing the appended hashes
3. Uses frequencies of a related corpus to deduce which hashes correspond to which keywords

**Experimental results:**

Server who plants emails with up to 10 keywords can identify hashes with <20% error rate
Conclusion

Systematic study of exploitability of multiple SE leakage types

• Servers have high capability to deduce query and document contents by observing client interactions

• Product claims must be sifted for potential compromises

• Need framework + experiments for understanding what one can do with leakage

• We’ve only scratched the surface…
  • Info retrieval and natural language methods!
Thank you!